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Public and private agri-environmental regulation in post-socialist economies: evidence 
from the Serbian Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Sector 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Using primary survey data and interview evidence this paper analyses the implementation and 
enforcement of public and private environmental regulation in the Serbian Fresh Fruit and 
Vegetable (FFV) sector. This provides a basis for engaging in a wider debate on the nature of 
agri-food regulation in post-socialist economies. Depictions of the restructuring of agri-food 
supply chains as a shift from public to private regulation are rejected. Rather two distinct supply 
chains co-exist: a small number of export oriented producers operate subject to extensive private 
regulation while the majority of FFV farmers occupy regulatory voids, immune to both private 
and private control. Those farmers operating under extensive private regulation are more likely 
to obey appropriate public regulation. Findings highlight the differentiated nature of regulatory 
regimes that can co-exist within a national production sector.  
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Agri-food regulation, agricultural standards, Serbia 
 
1. Introduction 
Globally, agri-food supply chains are being fundamentally transformed through greater 
internationalisation of markets (via a growth in trade, foreign direct investment and openness of 
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domestic markets) and regulation (spread of supra-national food laws, control agencies, 
certification bodies and private standards). The internationalisation of regulation is seen as both a 
response to, and catalyst for, greater international integration of markets. The restructuring of 
institutional regimes for agri-food production and marketing is altering profoundly the nature of 
market opportunities faced by, and the obligations placed on, producers globally (Hatanaka et al. 
2006; Swinnen and Maertens, 2007; Vogel, 1995). For instance, while the reform of formal 
regulation may promote opportunities for some, there is a danger that it will act as a barrier to 
trade in cases where governments and producers lack the institutional capacity and financial 
resources to meet the obligations of access (Henson and Loader, 2001; Busch et al. 2005).  
 
After the downfall of the Milošević regime, Serbia is, rather haphazardly, attempting to 
reform its economy and reintegrate into international markets and regulatory structures, and it 
has started out on the path toward European Union (EU) accession. Like many other post-
socialist states, Serbia’s economic fortunes during this process will be strongly tied to those of 
the agricultural sector. The agri-food sector accounted for approximately 14 per cent of Serbian 
GDP and 17 per cent of total exports in 2008 (Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia, 2009). 
In rural areas, agriculture remains the largest employer and backbone of the economy (World 
Bank, 2006). Within agriculture, Fresh Fruit and Vegetables (FFV) are of strategic importance, 
contributing 30 per cent of total agri-food exports by value in 2009 (Statistical Office of the 
Republic of Serbia, 2010). Moreover, FFV is widely perceived to be one of the few areas where 
Serbia could significantly increase its agri-food exports and the country has a longstanding 
international reputation for certain products such as raspberries.  
 
This paper analyses the implementation and enforcement of public and private agri-
environmental regulation in the Serbian FFV sector. In doing so the paper seeks to contribute to 
the literature on two grounds. First, as noted by Ouma (2010, p.199) ‘little is known in economic 
geography and related disciplines about how quality standards… are actually implemented [and] 
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enforced’, with a need to analyse how farmers ‘connect with these standards’. This is despite 
widespread acknowledgement of their growing importance for some producers and as a factor 
mediating rural development (Busch, 2000; Hatanaka et al. 2005; Jaffee and Henson, 2005; 
Swinnen and Maertens, 2007). This calls for fieldwork that engages with producers and is aware 
of the potential gap between formal regulations and everyday practices. Our focus is thus on 
implementation and enforcement rather than the process of standards setting. Second, utilising 
data from Serbia we seek to contribute to a wider literature on the reform of agri-food 
governance outside of ‘mature’, capitalist economies. The findings detail the presence of varied 
regulatory regimes co-existing within the same state: while the majority of producers operate in a 
regulatory void others are subject to extensive external control via private standards.   
 
2. Public and Private Agri-environmental Standards and the Regulation of Production 
 
Agricultural standards can be defined as rules governing the outcome or processes of the 
primary production of food and fibre. Agricultural standards may pertain to: (a) quality (e.g. 
organoleptic or cosmetic), (b) safety (e.g. freedom from contaminants or use of approved 
pesticides), (c) authenticity (e.g. guarantee of particular origin or production method) and (d) 
production process (e.g. organic) (Reardon, 2006).  Such standards may be initiated and enforced 
by public sector agencies (hereafter referred to as public standards) or non-state actors (private 
standards). The operationalisation of standards involves several distinct processes: setting, 
adoption, implementation and enforcement (Henson and Humphrey, 2009). 
 
In most European countries, the setting of public agricultural standards is strongly 
internationalised. For example in the UK, the Chemicals Regulation Directorate (CRD) 
undertakes surveillance and enforcement sampling of pesticide residues in accordance with 
Regulation (EC) No 396/2005 of the European Parliament and of the Council on maximum 
residue levels (MRLs). MRLs in the UK are thus set at the supra-national level although 
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enforcement rests with national bodies and local authorities. The UK and all other member states 
of the EU, as well the European Commission, are members of the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission (CAC), which oversees revisions to the Codex Alimentarius. The latter is a set of 
international, public standards for food production and hygiene, developed by the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the World Health Organization. The 
CAC has a dedicated committee on pesticide residues which establishes and reviews MRLs for 
particular pesticides. In contrast to the UK, Serbia’s regulations on MRLs are inconsistent with 
European regulations and date back to the Yugoslav era (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 1992). 
At the time of writing (Autumn 2010) Serbia was not yet an official candidate for EU 
membership and had not begun the formal process of legal harmonisation (approximation). 
While Serbia is a member of the CAC, it has been peripheral in terms of standards setting and 
Serbian and international MRLs remain inconsistent (Škrbić and Predojecić, 2008). 
 
Private standards may be third party arrangements, such as GlobalGAP (formerly 
EurepGAP) or the British Retail Consortium (BRC), or buyer specific (controlled independently 
by, for example, a single retailer). GlobalGAP is the most prominent private standard, requiring 
producers to demonstrate Good Agricultural Practices (GAPs) relating to sanitary, phytosanitary 
and environmental concerns (Henson and Humphrey, 2009; Ouma, 2010). A consortium of 
European retailers established GlobalGAP and its spread has been dramatic: by 2008, 94,000 
producers, in more than 80 countries, were certified and operating according to the standard. 
While GlobalGAP’s membership base increased dramatically, ‘executive power still rests with 
an exclusive club made up of representatives of big retailers and suppliers mainly from the 
global North’ (Ouma, 2010, p.201). 
 
For FFV, private agri-environmental standards typically cover pesticide use and 
application rates, traceability, water management, adoption of Integrated Crop Management 
systems, record keeping and self-inspection, harvesting and packaging, and transportation 
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practices. These private standards, developed initially in response to food safety concerns 
surrounding the potential contamination of FFV with food poisoning bacteria (such as E coli 
0157 or salmonella) and attempts to reduce pesticide residues, have evolved to embrace wider 
ethical and environmental concerns. In part, private standards are designed to ensure that 
producers meet the requirements of public standards. GlobalGAP, for example, seeks to make 
certain than FFV production complies with EU regulations on MRLs. However, private 
standards often ‘go beyond’ the requirements of public standards (Henson and Humphrey, 2009). 
For instance in 2007, the German retailer Metro unilaterally announced that it would only stock 
FFV with less than 70% of EU MRLs and would delist suppliers that failed to meet the tighter 
standard (Planet Retail, 2007). 
 
For FFV sold through the leading international retailers, private standards are the norm 
(Henson and Humphrey, 2009). Given the increasing concentration of global grocery markets, 
these retailers act as significant ‘gatekeepers’ to consumers. The use of private standards by non-
leading retailers in both developed and developing countries is also growing (Berdegué et al. 
2005; Fulponi, 2007). In local and wholesale markets in developing and transitional economies, 
private standards are rarely applied. However these fringe markets are declining in importance as 
supermarkets expand rapidly (Reardon et al. 2007a).   
 
Campbell et al. (2006) interpret the growth of private standards as symptomatic of the 
neo-liberalisation of agri-food production.  The neoliberal model of food regulation rests on the 
belief that human welfare can best be advanced by liberating entrepreneurial activities within an 
environment characterised by robust property rights, free markets and trade (Guthman, 2008). 
Advocates of a neo-liberalist approach argue that firms face strong commercial incentives to 
maintain customer loyalty and avoid damaging their reputation, so that self or market regulation, 
although based on private rather than public interest, may achieve outcomes that are similar or 
superior to state regulation. The latter is deemed often superfluous and dated, so that ‘regulated 
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markets have not proven efficient in responding to market forces and capitalising on new market 
opportunities’ (OECD, 1997, p.245).  
 
Busch and Bain (2004) perceive the growing practical influence of neo-liberalism has led 
to a ‘shift from public to private regulation’ (p.324). In contrast, the functions of the nation state 
are being ‘hollowed out: ‘redistributed upwards, to international and transnational organisations 
and institutions, downwards, to cities and regions, and outwards to non-state actors’ (Jessop, 
2002, p.159). As an illustrative case study of hollowing out, Busch (2000) notes that in 
Michigan, previously mandatory state standards became only advisory. Instead, exporters 
contract directly with British multiple retailers based on the latter’s quality standards. Under this 
state/market binary framework, private agricultural standards offer a competing governance 
mechanism to public regulation (Manning and Baines, 2004). 
 
The interpretation of the growth of private standards as characteristic of a stark shift 
away from public regulation has been, however, questioned extensively (Goodman and Watts, 
1994; Guthman, 2007; Guthman, 2008). Guthman (2007), drawing on the work of Peck and 
Tickell (2002), distinguishes usefully between ‘roll-back’ and ‘roll-out’ neo-liberalization. The 
former refers the hollowing out of welfare / regulatory states.  Roll-out neo-liberalization 
captures the development of new public-private institutional forms that were required to deal 
with inequalities and regulatory gaps created by the initial ‘roll-back’ process. The rollout phase 
of neo-liberalism is thus characterised by significant re-regulation and building of networks of 
governance. The creation of an enabling environment for ‘market forces’ requires new rules, 
rule-making bodies and coalitions of actors (Peck, 2004). For instance, Codex standards 
incorporate the approach pioneered by the U.S. government’s Hazard Analysis and Critical 
Control Point system. This requires managers, amongst other things, to establish: critical control 
points, record keeping procedures and systems for validation. Dunn (2008, p.252) argues that 
Codex by incorporating the principles of devolved, self regulation is ‘a good example of 
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neoliberal government at a distance’. Yet to form and revise Codex standards requires a complex 
set of committees, drawing on national Ministries, international agencies, scientific experts and 
industry representatives (Lee, 2009).  
 
Several authors attempt to characterise new modes of governance in the agri-food sector, 
defined by a cross-fertilisation of private and public regulation with the state co-opting aspects 
of, and instruments initially designed for, private governance with much private regulation 
becoming legally sanctioned and coercive in nature. This realignment has been referred to as 
hybridisation (Barling, 2004) or a form of co-regulation (Fearne and Garcia Martinez, 2005). 
The latter is defined by Garcia Martinez et al. (2007, p.302) as ‘an approach in which a mixture 
of instruments is brought to bear on a specific problem…[which] involves self-regulation and 
legislative action working together in a manner that mutually reinforces one another’. An 
element of co-regulation is, according to Garcia Martinez et al. (2007), therefore co-operation 
between public and private sectors in the process of creating new rules.  
 
The majority of empirical studies focus on mature, capitalist countries, skewing the 
development of theory regarding new modes of governance in the agri-food sector (Guthman, 
2007). For instance, the application of the notion of ‘roll-back’ neo-liberalism is specifically 
designed to capture reforms that occurred in states previously anchored in what Jessop (1997) 
terms ‘Atlantic Fordism’. However, several studies do specifically address developing states, 
particularly the question of whether farmers in developing states are able to meet the private 
standards of, for the most part Western, food retailers (Dolan and Humphrey, 2000; Okello and 
Swinton, 2007; Reardon et al. 2009). These studies found that the imposition of tighter 
standards, most commonly GlobalGAP, tend to lead to a shake out of the supply base, with a 
significant reduction in sourcing from small farms (Dolan and Humphrey, 2000; Hernández et al. 
2007; Humphrey, 2009).  However small-scale producers may continue to serve ‘modern’ supply 
chains if larger operators are absent (Reardon et al. 2007b) or they institute successfully co-
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operative marketing arrangements (Narrod et al. 2009). Yet it should be noted that most of these 
studies focus on developing states that are longstanding agri-food exporters to Western markets 
such as Kenya (Dolan and Humphrey, 2000; Okello and Swinton, 2007; Narrod et al. 2009), 
Guatemala (Berdegue et al., 2005; Hernández et al. 2007) and Mexico (Reardon et al., 2007b). 
Access to reformed supply chains may be more problematic for producers in countries lacking 
traditional export infrastructure, marketing arrangements and training systems.  
 
In one of the few studies of the impact of food standards in a post-socialist context, Dunn 
(2003, p.1495) argues that they have unannounced and unforeseen consequences when they 
encounter ‘specific geographies with their own histories, institutional structures, and social 
norms’. Based on ethnographic research for the Polish meat industry, Dunn (2003) notes that 
international standards and multinational agribusiness encountered strong resistance from Polish 
smallholders and meatpackers, who used a variety of mechanisms, honed in the socialist era 
(unofficial markets, networks of political protest) to create other, informal, nontariff trade 
barriers.  As standards are implemented in particular local contexts they, therefore, generate 
‘unique regulatory landscapes rather than the uniform ones standardizers envisage’ (Dunn, 2003, 
p.1495).  
 
In subsequent work on the Republic of Georgia, Dunn (2008) notes that despite the 
Saakashvili government’s attempts to integrate with Western standards and international 
agencies, the collapse of the domestic food industry left the country dependent on household, 
subsistence production. The latter inhabits a ‘stateless space’ outside of neoliberal projects 
because it is ‘not interesting enough, or not useful enough, to merit governance’ (p.255). 
Notwithstanding some notable exceptions, such as viticulture, Georgian agriculture is an 
‘abandoned territory: a space free from mobile neoliberal calculations because neither state 
agencies nor capitalist firms choose to calculate there’ (Dunn, 2008, p.255). This calls for greater 
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attention to be paid to how standards ‘become geographically variable as they are implemented 
in particular contexts’ (Dunn, 2003, p.1495). 
 
The growth of international public and private agricultural standards is important for the 
Serbian FFV sector because it affects Serbia’s ability to access new markets (especially the 
value-added ones of Western Europe) and come to terms with less favourable access to 
existing/nearby markets as neighbouring countries join the EU. Accessing these European export 
markets requires both compliance with international public standards and, increasingly, stiffer 
private regulation from the main buyers.  
 
3. Methodology 
To assess the implementation and enforcement of public and private regulation, the authors 
conducted both a survey of commercial Serbian FFV producers and in-depth interviews with key 
actors. The survey collected data on compliance with, and knowledge of, public environmental 
regulations, attitudes to state regulation, current problems faced by farmers, buyer requirements 
and use of private standards, and farm / farmer characteristics. Farmers were also given the 
opportunity to provide additional, qualitative responses, presenting their views and situation. 
Collectively the survey sought to obtain a picture of commercial FFV producers’ engagement 
with public and private environmental regulation. The sample comprises 165 useable responses.  
 
Data collection from commercial FFV farmers occurred in two locations: (a) municipality 
of Grocka and (b) from the rest of Serbia. Grocka was chosen as the principal fruit growing area 
in the country, renowned for its sour cherries, apricots, plums, peaches and grapes. Production is 
organised mainly on small, privately-owned family farms.1 All the surveyed farms are 
                                                 
1
 At the outset of the research it was expected that the penetration of private, and enforcement of public, regulation 
may be higher in Grocka given the importance and concentration of FFV production in this area. However, as there 
are no significant differences between the samples from Grocka and the rest of Serbia in terms of the 
implementation and enforcement of regulation, this distinction is not pursued in the analysis. 
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commercial producers.2 Survey data indicate that their main income comes from selling FFV, 
principally via local wholesale markets.  
Table 1 details the structure of the sample compared against data on farm structures taken 
from the 2002 Agricultural Census. As the sample excludes subsistence holdings, farms of less 
than 3 ha are underrepresented and farms of greater than 10 hectares are overrepresented 
compared with the Agricultural Census. Consequently the mean farm size in the sample is higher 
(5.5 ha) than that reported in the 2002 Census (3 ha).  
 
Table 1 about here 
 
Before conducting the survey, the authors met with key persons (village mayors, district 
councillors, prominent farmers) in Grocka and contacted other FFV farmers and support 
organisations in Serbia. This allowed for initial discussion of the project’s objectives and assisted 
with the construction of the sample frame. Individual farmers were identified from contacts with 
local and regional authorities, village mayors, other farmers and personal contacts, from which a 
cross-section of respondents was drawn. Survey data collection occurred in 2005/6 via face to 
face interviews, conducted usually on-farm. Five farmers, approached face-to-face, refused to 
answer the survey questions. 
 
In addition, in-depth interviews were conducted with 19 key policy actors (current and ex-
officials of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Water Management [MAFWM], Ministry 
of Science and Environmental Protection, the Water Inspectorate and other Serbian institutes, 
European agencies and commercial producers). The semi-structured interviews occurred 
between 2004 and 2009, with some aiding questionnaire design and others addressing the 
survey’s findings and implications.  
                                                 
2
 A commercial farm is defined as one which sells a proportion of its production (market exchange) and is 
contrasted with subsistence producers, where agri-food output is consumed within the household. The World Bank 
(2006) estimates that only 100,000 of Serbia’s 600,000 ‘family farms’ are commercially oriented. 
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4. Results 
4.1 Public Regulation 
Survey and interview evidence indicate that enforcement of public environment standards is, 
overall, very poor. This section highlights three examples: permits for water extraction, pesticide 
use and quality control, and non-cultivation of land. The section concludes with a discussion of 
farmers’ overall assessment of the Serbian state’s regulatory capacity. 
 
Permits for water extraction 
According to the 1991 Water Law, farmers should possess a permit or licence for water 
extraction from rivers, streams, bore holes and, in certain circumstances, from natural springs 
and wells. Survey data (Table 2) indicate that this is occurring only in a minority of cases.3 River 
or stream extraction was used as a source of water by 30 farmers, of whom only 6 had a permit 
or licence. Similarly, bore holes were used by 25 farmers but only 6 were licensed. Sixteen 
farmers in the sample utilised natural springs or wells, but only one had the requisite permit to 
use it. These breaches of the Water Law are unlikely to be investigated because individually they 
are not viewed as a priority by the chronically under-funded Water Inspectorate. As one farmer 
noted ‘No one pays for water or has permits. Who will know?’ Yet the collective impact of 
unregulated extraction on water resources is significant (UNECE, 2002).4  
 
Table 2 about here 
 
On average the 13 farmers with appropriate permits/ licences, sold 46 per cent of their 
output on contract (with a private buyer) compared with only 20 per cent for those with 
                                                 
3
 The data in Table 2 refer to farmers who require a permit / license for extraction. Other farmers may use mains 
water or irrigation water which does not require such a permit / license for extraction. 
 
4
 Excessive extraction reduces water quality as rivers and aquifers lose their dilution capacity for absorbing diffused 
pollution. Illegal extraction also reduces the supply of resources available for legal use (e.g. public water systems).  
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unauthorised water use. This suggests a potential linkage between private sector contracting and 
adherence to state legislation, which is explored in greater depth below. The differences between 
those adhering to and those ignoring state regulation however cannot be reduced purely to a 
debate about scale: there are no significant differences between those without and those with 
permits / licences in terms of farm size (the means for the two groups are 6.2 and 6.8 ha 
respectively).  
 
Pesticide use and quality control 
In Serbia, there is a lack of transparency on pesticide use and their application is largely left to 
the conscience of individual producers with few checks and controls. No comprehensive testing 
for contamination of agricultural soils or FFV sold on the domestic market occurs (Marković et 
al. 2010). It is common for FFV farmers to overuse pesticides, both in terms of the number and 
concentration of treatments. On the one hand small-scale farmers do not have precise equipment 
for measurement and on the other hand they want to make sure that the ‘pesticide does its job’. 
Moreover, some producers fail to observe guidelines on the time that should elapse between 
treating crops and market sales (usually 40 days). One former Minister of the MAFWM noted 
that ‘farmers often have two different production methods; one for the market and other for 
production for self-consumption. Basically the difference in the methods relates to the amount 
and frequency pesticides are used’. 
The 2009 Law on Pesticides charges the plant inspection department of the MAFWM 
with the task of controlling the use of pesticides, principally through residue testing, and 
reviewing records which producers are legally obligated to keep. However, survey evidence 
suggests that out of 165 farmers, only 19 kept a pesticide log. Those that maintained a pesticide 
log did so principally at the insistence of private buyers. According to one ex-official of the 
MAFWM, in 2007 there were only 34 phytosanitary inspectors of which 29 were assigned to 
border posts. Given that Serbia has approximately 600,000 ‘family farms’ (World Bank, 2006), 
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which are overwhelmingly not engaged in exporting, the probability of a state inspection of a 
pesticide log is remote. 
 
In practice, therefore, state phytosanitary inspectors only control the quality of FFV at 
Serbia’s borders (both exports and imports). These inspectors check declarations and grading, 
and test samples for residues, contaminants and water content. Border inspections have 
uncovered extensive evidence of inappropriate pesticide use. For example, in 2007 a 
consignment of peaches bound for Slovenia contained ten times the EU permitted threshold for 
dimethoate (an insecticide). The explanation of the Minister of Agriculture was that it was due 
weather conditions: "We had a dry year and maybe a little more application of chemicals” 
(Knezović, 2007). 
 
The absence of quality control by the state is despite the fact that some land used for 
growing crops is severely contaminated, typically from industrial pollution (Marković et al. 
2010). For example the Kolubarskog Basin suffers from arsenic poisoning derived from lignite 
dust. Some exporters, who know that their produce will not meet the pesticide residue and 
contaminant (e.g. lead, mercury, arsenic) thresholds of importing countries, switch their produce 
to the unsupervised local market. As one farmer noted: ‘there are no limits or regulations on the 
use of pesticides or fertilisers and no one takes samples or checks the level of contamination on 
the market….farmers apply large doses of chemicals’. 
 
Storage and disposal of pesticide packaging is also a problem. Serbia currently does not 
have any designated location for disposal of dangerous waste or packaging for pesticides. 
Farmers do not feel obliged to collect and safely dispose of the packaging. New procedures on 
waste packaging and wrapping material, which would include a deposit and obligation to return 
the packaging to wholesalers, are yet to become law.  
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Cultivation of arable land  
According to the law on agricultural land, all arable land must be cultivated. Otherwise, 
the owner of the land is obliged to pay a fine. Although this policy has been in existence since 
the 1990s, official statistics record around 100,000 ha of arable land being left uncultivated 
annually.5 Despite such a significant land area remaining uncultivated, there is no evidence of 
any landowners ever paying a fine. Similarly, every year some agricultural land is transferred to 
other uses, mainly private construction, which according to Serbian law, requires a permit and 
payment for change of land use. An ex-employee of the MAFWM estimated that approximately 
only half of changes are reported to the authorities. This may be an underestimate: Petrović 
(2001) calculates that over 80 per cent of new flats and houses built in Belgrade during the 1990s 
were done so illegally, amounting to some 200,000 homes. 
 
 
Overall assessment of Serbian state’s regulatory capacity 
The survey elicited farmers’ beliefs regarding the Serbian state’s ability to effectively 
regulate agri-environmental issues. Respondents rated the degree to which they agreed with 
statements on a five-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 ‘strongly disagree’ to 5 ‘strongly agree’. 
Farmers have strikingly little faith in public regulation: for example, less than five per cent 
agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that ‘farm polluters are fined when they break the 
law’ (Table 3). Only 5.4 per cent of respondents agreed or strongly agreed with the statement 
that ‘water use is effectively controlled by the state’. The inability of the state to implement and 
enforce public standards mirrors the findings of Berdegué et al. (2005) for Central America. The 
majority of Serbian FFV farmers thus operate in ‘stateless spaces’ akin to what Dunn (2008) 
describes for the Republic of Georgia. However, while in the Georgian case, household food 
                                                 
5
 One surveyed farmed revealed that his farmland was left uncultivated in 2004. 
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production lay outside any regulatory regime, in Serbia it is the bulk of commercial farms as 
well. 
 
Table 3 about here 
 
Overall there are 8 farmers in the sample who on average ‘agree’ or ‘strongly agree’ with 
the statements in Table 3. These eight farmers are not significantly larger in size than the rest of 
the sample but do sell a higher proportion of their output on contract (40 per cent) compared to 
the rest of the sample (13 per cent).  
 
4.2 Private Regulation 
Regarding the implementation of private standards, farmers were asked about the behaviour of 
buyers and any regulations enforced concerning quality control, the use of pesticides and water 
testing (Table 4). Results are disaggregated to compare those selling to domestic and foreign 
buyers with the former group split between those with and without a contract (all those supplying 
a foreign owned buyer had a contract). In less than 5 per cent of cases is the main buyer foreign 
owned. Firstly considering the whole sample, the most salient private regulation is at the point of 
supply: 16.4 per cent of buyers reject produce in poor condition; but only one in ten buyers test 
for contaminants. Fewer than 11 per cent of farmers are required to keep a pesticide log. Only 
5.5 per cent are directed as to what agri-chemicals to use and only 4.8 per cent have their water 
quality tested. 
 
Significant differences are apparent depending on the type of main buyer (Table 4).6 
Private regulation is almost entirely absent for farmers supplying domestic buyers without a 
contract. These farmers sell via spot (wholesale) markets without guaranteed prices, and buyers 
                                                 
6
 The analysis focuses on relationships by type of main buyer. Data collection, however, captured all supplier 
relationships. This revealed that the vast majority deal exclusively with only one type of buyer. For instance, 74.3 
per cent of farms sampled supplied only local markets and auctions. From the eight firms that sold to foreign owned 
buyers on contract only two also supplied local markets and auctions. 
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do not interfere with agricultural practices. This type of buyer also does not provide any credit, 
physical inputs, training, transportation, loan guarantees, machinery, specialist on-farm storage, 
or investment to farmers. This is similar to the modus operandi of local and wholesale markets in 
developing countries (Humphrey, 2009). 
 
In contrast all foreign buyers reject produce that is in poor condition. In seven out of the 
eight cases of farmers having a foreign purchaser, the buyer tests for contaminants, insists that a 
pesticide log is kept, specifies what agri-chemicals can be used, tests water quality and rejects 
output with contaminants/residues above agreed threshold levels. For those who supply foreign 
owned buyers, private regulation is therefore of greater practical relevance. This mirrors the 
findings for export led supply chains in developing countries (Dolan and Humphrey, 2000; 
Ouma, 2010). However, the greater practical relevance of private regulation for Serbian FFV 
exporters has not emerged out of a conscious political strategy of deregulation, hollowing out of 
the state or public-private co-operation, as has been depicted for many Western markets. Rather 
it reflects the state’s failure to adequately implement and enforce its own regulation and the role 
of private standards in determining international market access.  
 
Those who supply domestically owned buyers with a contract lie between these two 
extremes: the majority of domestically owned buyers who use contracts do reject produce that is 
in poor condition but only a minority stipulate specific agri-environmental practices. A gradient 
of rising private regulation is therefore apparent from domestic wholesale markets to 
domestically managed contracts and then contracts with foreign owned buyers. In terms of the 
involvement of buyers in production practices the greatest jump is between domestically oriented 
contracts and those with foreign owned buyers. 
 
Table 4 about here 
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Farmers rated potential problems on a five point scale, ranging from 1 equals of ‘no 
importance to them’ and 5 ‘most important problem they face’. Again the sample is divided into 
three groups (those selling to a domestically owned main buyer without a contract, domestic 
buyer with contract, and foreign-owned buyer with contract). The mean scores for each group 
and ANOVA F-test statistics are reported in Table 5. 
 
Table 5 about here 
 
 For all three groups of farmers, the most pressing problems are low prices, meeting the 
quality standards of buyers and price fluctuations. However significant variations in the ratings 
of potential problems are apparent between the three groups. Those supplying domestic buyers 
without a contract record a higher mean score for low prices received, meeting the quality 
standards of buyers and price fluctuations. As Reardon et al. (2007b) note for Mexico, these 
farmers are most likely to be trapped in a vicious circle of low value-added production. 
However, at present there are minimal immediate incentives for such producers to improve their 
environmental practices as most domestic purchasers do not insist on this, and they do not pay a 
premium for FFV produced under such conditions. As this group sells via wholesale markets 
price fluctuations are relatively more pronounced. Access to inputs is a more serious problem for 
these farmers but, as transactions are immediate, then delayed payments from buyers are fairly 
insignificant.  
 
 Farmers who supply foreign owned buyers suffer more from delayed payments than 
problems of access to inputs. Those possessing contracts with domestically owned buyers report 
meeting the quality standards of buyers being slightly less of a problem (and low prices received 
as a higher problem) than farmers with contracts with foreign owned companies. This may 
reflect that private regulation is less developed on the domestic market so that it is easier to meet 
the demands of such buyers. Farms supplying foreign owned buyers are noticeably larger (mean 
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of 16.45 ha) than those supplying domestic buyers either with or without a contract (means of 
6.07 and 5.76 ha respectively). This echoes work on developing countries which found that 
small-scale producers are more likely to serve the domestic rather than export markets (Dolan 
and Humphrey, 2000; Humphrey, 2009).   
 
4.3 Linkages between public and private regulation 
Significant differences are apparent between farmers’ attitudes to the Serbian regulatory system 
and the type of main buyer (Table 6), although the ordering of trust varies across the scale items. 
Those without a contract supplying domestic buyers overall have the lowest level of faith in the 
Serbian regulatory system. This group is pretty immune to any private or public regulation. 
Overall, those supplying a domestic buyer on a contractual basis have the most confidence in 
Serbian public regulation although this is still modest. It may be that those supplying foreign 
owned buyers are more aware of international public and private standards and are therefore 
more critical than those who contract with domestic firms.  
 
Table 6 about here 
 
Figure 1 details consistent relationships between the imposition of private environmental 
standards and possession of an appropriate state permit/licence for water extraction. For instance, 
of those whose buyer specifies what agri-chemicals can be used, 50 per cent have an appropriate 
state licence. In contrast, of those whose buyer does not specify what agri-chemicals can be used, 
only 15.8 per cent have an appropriate state licence or permit. Similarly, for those whose buyer 
tests the quality of water used, 50 per cent have an appropriate licence/permit for water 
extraction against only 15.8 per cent of those whose farm water is not tested. While there is thus 
widespread flouting of state regulation, and notwithstanding the relative small number of 
responses in this category, those who are subject to private environmental standards appear more 
likely to obtain appropriate public permissions.  
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Those serving foreign owned buyers who meet state regulations are therefore subject to 
co-regulation in the sense that ‘a mixture of public and private regulatory instruments is brought 
to bear on a specific problem’ (Garcia Martinez et al., 2007, p.302). However, this has not 
emerged out of co-operation between the public and private sectors. No interviewee identified 
any instance of explicit co-operation between private sector actors and the Serbian state 
regarding FFV standards and regulation. 
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
The main reason cited for greater adherence to public regulation by those supplying 
foreign entities was to ‘legitimise’ their activities and avoid being excluded by buyers as part of 
their monitoring process. For example one market gardener, who supplied salads to an 
international hospitality company remarked: ‘my salad washing plant is illegally built and I do 
not pay for my washing water. I paid a Milošević official to sort it out and have never received a 
bill. I want to obtain retrospective legalisation of my premises and will have to construct a 
holding reservoir for waste processing water. To do this I need to build an accumulator to 
prevent waste water going into the local channel. This is a condition of Belgrade City Council. 
This is an extra cost and time consuming…[but]..I do not want to jeopardise my exclusive 
producer status [with buyer].’ 
 
Two distinct supply chains, therefore, co-exist in Serbia. There are a small number of 
larger producers that supply export markets and comply with the extensive private standards of 
international buyers. As for FFV exporters in developing countries, the implementation and 
enforcement of these standards results ‘in a previously unknown degree of formal supply-base 
monitoring and quality assurance’ (Ouma, 2010, p.211). Meeting these standards is a condition 
of entry to such export supply chains. Distinct from such producers is a mass of small-scale 
 20
farms that serve local and wholesale markets. In practice these producers are subject to little 
public or private regulation. In keeping with local and wholesale markets in many emerging 
economies (Humphrey, 2009; Henson and Humphrey, 2009), there is no pressure from buyers to 
adopt private standards and public regulation is poorly enforced. What is currently absent from 
Serbia is a third potential supply chain – large grocery retailers serving the domestic market. 
Food retailing remains extremely fragmented in Serbia with those supermarkets chains that are 
present being small and procuring FFV via specialist wholesalers. This contrasts with many 
other states in Central and Eastern Europe, East Asia and Central America which witnessed the 
rapid growth of supermarket chains in the late 1990s and early 2000s, often linked to foreign 
direct investment (Dries et al. 2004; Reardon, 2006; Reardon et al. 2007). Large supermarket 
chains in emerging markets typically adopt private standards to protect the global reputation of 
the retailer and maximise the value gap with traditional formats (Berdegué et al. 2005). 
Wholesale markets are by-passed in favour of centralised procurement systems (Dries et al. 
2004; Berdegué et al. 2005). This may lead to the displacement of local, small-scale producers. 
For instance, the Republic of Moldova has a longstanding reputation in horticulture, yet two 
years after Metro Cash & Carry entered the Moldovan market, announcing that it was willing to 
procure from domestic producers, all local suppliers were still unable to meet its quality and 
quantity requirements so that the company imported all of its FFV (Gorton and White, 2007). 
There is a danger that producers unable to meet the private standards of multiple retailers, in 
countries dominated by supermarkets, will be sidelined into declining, low value-added markets, 
further depressing rural incomes and stimulating out-migration. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper assesses the enforcement of public and private environmental regulation in the 
Serbian FFV sector as a basis for engaging in wider debates concerning agri-food governance. 
Rather than a broad shift from public to private regulation (Busch and Bain, 2004), survey 
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evidence reveals that the Serbian case is characterised by the co-existence of two supply chains 
with markedly different regulatory systems. The majority of producers supply the local market 
and are subject to minimal public or private regulation. These farmers inhabit stateless spaces 
and at present there is little internal pressure from either public bodies or local private buyers for 
these producers to alter their practices. While such producers are often seen as characteristic of 
the ‘global South’ (Ouma, 2010), our evidence highlights their importance with a European state 
as well. Co-existing alongside these stateless spaces is a smaller group of producers, subject to 
tight regulation, who are integrated into international agri-food systems. As Dunn (2008) notes 
for Georgia, and clearly evident in Serbia, international standards rather than promoting 
uniformity and inclusion, in post-socialist economies are creating more variegated spaces of 
differential regulation. Initiatives such as GlobalGAP and company specific private standards 
therefore represent a novel and increasingly important form of socioeconomic polarization both 
within and across post-socialist states. 
 
 Private regulation is often depicted as an alternative or competing governance mechanism 
to the state (Manning and Baines, 2004). However, regarding the relationship between 
enforcement of public and private regulation in Serbia, there is some evidence of a linkage 
between engagement in contracting and compliance with private and public environmental 
standards / regulation. As part of fulfilling the private requirements of buyers, producers may 
seek to legitimise their practices according to domestic law. In this way private standards rather 
than being a replacement for public regulation or a form of environmental deregulation may 
actually promote or reinforce a degree of compliance. However, given the relatively small 
number of Serbian farmers that supply under contract, this conclusion remains tentative. 
However, it is clear in the Serbian case that any relationship between private standards and 
compliance with the state has not emerged out of formal co-operation between the two or the 
‘bolting on’ of private controls to domestic legislation. Rather, it is largely an unintended 
consequence. 
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Much previous work, based on mature capitalist economies, links the reform agri-food 
supply chains to wider processes of neo-liberalization (Guthman 2007, 2008). However, 
historical models of ‘roll-back’ followed by ‘roll-out’ neo-liberalization, while fitting states 
previously anchored in Atlantic Fordism, sit uneasily with the Serbian case. The Serbian state 
does not effectively regulate agri-environmental activities. This is not due to a triumph of neo-
liberalism, or the product of a reconstituted, hollowed out state underlying competitive 
capitalism, but rather reflects a longstanding inability of the state to produce environmental 
public goods.  
 
 At present the majority of FFV producers in Serbia serve the domestic market with little 
pressure to adopt private standards. Given there is no price premium on the domestic market for 
observing such standards, forcing producers, at least in the short-term, to comply would be 
counterproductive. However, if Serbia were to undergo the rapid growth of supermarket chains, 
private standards would become more salient, raising the prospect of domestic producers being 
displaced. Under this scenario, if small-scale FFV producers were unable to upgrade, a 
significant shake out of the supply base would be likely. Those remaining in farming but 
excluded from supplying supermarkets face being condemned, in the long-run, to supplying only 
increasingly low value added and declining wholesale markets.  
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Table 1: Distribution of survey respondents by farm size 
 
Farm size Band Number of farms in 
sample 
% of sample % of farms in each size band 
according to the Agricultural 
census 
Up to 1 ha 17 10.3 24.9 
1.01 – 3 ha 29 17.6 32.0 
3.01 – 5 ha 46 27.9 18.0 
5.01 – 8 ha 36 21.8 13.6 
8.01 – 10 ha 11 6.7 5.0 
10.01 – 15 ha 15 9.1 4.1 
Greater than 15 ha 11 6.7 2.3 
    
Total 165 100.0 100.0 
Source: survey data and Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia (2004) 
 
 
Table 2: Water use by farmers requiring a permit / licence for extraction 
 
 Number of farmers reporting 
use without appropriate permit 
/ licence 
Number with permit / licence 
for extraction 
River or stream extraction 24 6 
Bore hole 19 6 
Natural spring /wells 15 1 
Mean farm size (ha) 6.21 6.77 
Source: survey data 
 
 
 
Table 3: Farmers’ opinion of the effectiveness of the Serbian regulatory system in relation to agricultural 
standards. 
 
 Rating of agreement / disagreement with statement (% of all responses) 
Statement Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Agree Strongly agree 
Water pollution is effectively 
controlled by the state 
50.3 32.7 10.9 4.8 1.2 
The use of agri-chemicals is 
effectively controlled 
46.1 35.2 13.9 3.6 1.2 
Farm pollution is effectively 
monitored 
40.0 33.3 23.0 3.0 0.6 
Farm polluters are fined when they 
break the law 
42.4 21.8 31.5 2.4 1.8 
Source: survey data 
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Table 4: A comparison of the presence of private environmental standards by buyer type. 
 
Private environmental standard 
employed by main buyer  
% of those who sell 
to domestically 
owned main buyer 
without contract 
(n=130) 
% of those who sell 
to domestically 
owned main buyer 
with a contract 
(n=27) 
% of those who sell 
to a foreign owned 
buyer with contract 
(n=8) 
% of total 
sample 
(n=165) 
Rejects produce in poor condition 0.0 70.4 100.0 16.4 
Insists that pesticide log is kept 0.0 40.7 87.5 10.9 
Tests for contaminants 1.5 29.6 87.5 10.3 
Rejects output with contaminants / 
residues above threshold level 
0.8 29.6 87.5 9.7 
Specifies what agri-chemicals can 
be used 
0.0 7.4 87.5 5.5 
Tests quality of water used 0.6 3.7 87.5 4.3 
Source: survey data 
 
 
Table 5: Comparison of the rating of potential problems by buyer type  
 Domestic 
buyer without 
contract 
Domestic 
buyer with 
contract 
Foreign buyer 
contract 
F-test 
Low prices received 4.54 4.40 4.14 1.24 
Meeting the quality standards of buyers 4.45 4.07 4.13 2.92* 
Price fluctuations 4.22 3.93 4.00 2.64* 
Access to inputs 4.06 3.89 3.25 3.11** 
Shortage of water (quantity issue) 3.89 3.69 3.75 0.33 
Delayed payments from buyers 2.23 3.63 3.71 14.88*** 
Interest rates 2.94 3.54 3.38 1.93 
Quality of water used for FFV 3.03 3.00 3.25 0.12 
     
Mean farm size (ha) 5.76 6.07 16.46 17.33*** 
* Significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** Significant at the 1% level. 
Source: survey data 
 
 
Table 6: Farmers’ opinions of the effectiveness of the Serbian regulatory system by buyer type 
 Mean score (1= strongly disagree, 5= strongly agree)  
 Domestic buyer 
without contract 
Domestic buyer 
with contract 
Foreign 
buyer 
contract 
F-test 
Water pollution is effectively 
controlled by the state 
1.62 2.15 2.25 5.12*** 
The use of agri-chemicals is 
effectively controlled 
1.66 2.37 1.75 7.27*** 
Farm pollution is effectively 
monitored 
1.81 2.44 1.75 6.14*** 
Farm polluters are fined when they 
break the law 
1.85 2.74 1.75 9.97*** 
*** Significant at the 1% level 
Source: survey data 
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Figure 1: Relationships between use of private environmental standards and possession of appropriate state 
licence / permit for water use / extraction 
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Source: survey data 
 
